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Abstract: The article aims to trace the dynamics of contention in austerity-driven Slov-
enia, explain why it ended, through the processes of demobilization, despite the pro-
test movement’s initial successes, and verify the explanatory power of Charles Tilly 
and Sidney Tarrow’s theoretical framework of demobilization. The analysis applies the 
method of source analysis, conceptual qualitative content analysis, and the conceptual 
framework of contentious politics. In doing so, it addresses the research problems of the 
dynamics of contention in Slovenia and why the contention resulted in demobilization. 
The article argues that after mass mobilization an upward scale shift appeared. The shift 
moved the contention beyond its local origins in Maribor, touched on the interests and 
values of new subjects, and involved a shift of venue to sites where the demands might 
have been met by state institutions. The dynamics of contention was a cycle of active 
and passive contentious episodes. The movement identity shift and successful recogni-
tion of its claims influenced the performances and episode sequence. The processes of 
demobilization started when people stopped attending protests, organizing particular 
performances, and implementing innovations to modular performances instead. De-
mobilization occurred when most of the protesters became discouraged from protest 
through boredom and a desire to return to everyday routines.
Key words: demobilization, dynamics of contention, collective identity, protest 
movement, contentious repertoire
Introduction and Methodological Assumptions for the Analysis
On November 2, 2012, a wave of mass protests began in Maribor, Slovenia, and continued until December 31, 2013. In general, the 
contentious movement which arose shared certain worldviews: increasing 
1 This paper is a result of the research project The Culture of Political Vio-
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discontent with the governing elites and democracy, as well as a strength-
ening sense of solidarity (Perković, Učakar, 2017, p. 304). The protests 
aimed to repeal the austerity measures that had been imposed on the state 
by the European Central Bank and government (Kirn, 2013; Toplišek, 
Thomassen, 2017), eradicate corruption and clientelism, and divest the 
mayor of Maribor, Franc Kangler, the right-wing government leader Jan-
ez Janša, and the opposition leader Zoran Janković of public functions on 
charges of venality (STA, T. M., 2013b). The eventual successful resolu-
tion of some of these contentious claims in itself gives little explanation 
as to why those demanding change stopped doing so at the end of 2013. 
Firstly, Slovenia did not abandon the austerity measures that were imple-
mented over the crisis in the field of social security payments even in part 
until January 1, 2018 (Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 2017, 
p. 30), long after the processes of demobilization (December 31, 2013). 
Secondly, corruption and clientelism did not subside after 2013 (GAN 
Integrity, 2015). Thirdly, the contentious activity continued after some of 
the protesters’ goals were achieved. Due to the protests, Kangler stepped 
down on December 6, 2012 and left office on December 31, 2012 (Media 
servis, R.I., 2012; Rubin, S. M., 2012). On January 17, 2013, Janković 
temporarily resigned from his role as president of the Positive Slovenia 
party (Pozitivna Slovenija) after being accused of corruption in an official 
report by the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (Petrovcic, 
2015). Janša was subsequently convicted of corruption and sentenced to 
two years in prison on June 5, 2013 (BBC, 2013). It is worth noting that 
the protesters stopped making further accusations six months to a year 
after these personnel changes in the state apparatus.
Although the study of austerity-driven contentious politics is growing, 
considerably more attention is paid to mobilization than demobilization 
(Hayes, 2017, p. 22). Current works scrutinize and explain the processes 
of social appropriation (Baumgarten, 2013, p. 457), boundary activation 
(Andronikidou, Kovras, 2012, p. 707) and radicalization (Rak, 2017, 
p. 292; 2018), identify contentious actors (Vobič et al., 2014, p. 77), or 
focus on performances (Zamponi, González, 2017; D’urso, 2014), reper-
toires of contention (Ancelovici, 2015, p. 189; Musić, 2013, p. 321), pro-
test policing (Zavratnik, Sori, 2016), and opportunity structures (Sitrin, 
Azzellini, 2014). They contribute to our understanding of why people 
begin collective claims-making and pursue contentious politics. Yet we 
know little about the sources of demobilization in times of austerity, as 
they remain a largely untouched issue even in specialist literature.
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This article aims to trace the dynamics of contention in austerity-driv-
en Slovenia and explain why it ended through the process of demobiliza-
tion. The theoretical category of contention allows us to bring together 
relationships between subjects, objects and claims and compare their 
changes over time. The research draws on Slovenia instead of any other 
austerity-driven state because a complete cycle of contention occurred 
there. Importantly, the case study does not attempt to be representative 
of the whole Eurozone, but it may serve as a pilot project conducted be-
fore implementing a full-scale examination. It also does double duty by 
describing contentious politics in the state which has been insufficiently 
studied in the field of anti-austerity movements (Giugni, Grasso, 2015; 
della Porta, 2015; 2017; Klandermans, van Stekelenburg, 2016; Ger-
baudo, 2017). The secondary goal is to verify the explanatory power of 
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow’s theoretical framework of demobiliza-
tion (2015, p. 120). So, the analysis addresses the research problems of 
the dynamics of contention in post-2008 Slovenia and why the contention 
ended in demobilization in this case.
According to this theory, after mass mobilization, a process of upward 
scale shift occurred in Slovenian contentious politics (Tilly, Tarrow, 2015, 
p. 125). This shift moved the contention beyond its local origins in Mari-
bor, touched on the interests and values of new subjects, and involved 
a shift of venue to sites where contention was likely to have greater im-
pact, where the objects of the protesters’ demands could be threatened 
(Tilly, Tarrow, 2015, p. 125). The dynamics of contention involved a cy-
cle of contentious episodes, marked by alternate episodes of collective 
claims-making and lack thereof. The identity shifts and successful ex-
pression of claims influenced the performances and episode sequence 
(Tilly, Tarrow, 2015, pp. 30, 37). Demobilization began when most of 
the protesters became discouraged, due to repression, boredom, and the 
desire to return to their normal everyday lives. In such circumstances, the 
leaders of protest movements can respond in one of two ways; either by 
the institutionalization of their movement, understood as the progression 
from disorderly street movements to organized party politics, or by esca-
lation, based on the progressive substitution of more extreme goals and 
more robust tactics for more moderate ones in order to retain the interest 
of their supporters and attract new ones (Tilly, Tarrow, 2015, p. 130).
The subject, subject matter, territory, and time aspects of contentious 
politics establish the research field. The field includes two major con-
tentious actors. Firstly, there are political actors who made anti-austerity 
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claims, which led to coordinated efforts based on shared aims, of which 
the government was a target (Tilly, Tarrow, 2015, p. 7). Secondly, it in-
volves the addressees of the claims, the government. This research is fo-
cused on the interactions between these contentious actors between No-
vember 2, 2012 and December 31, 2013 in Slovenia in all police units: 
Celje, Koper, Kranj, Ljubljana, Maribor, Murska Sobota, Nova Gorica, 
and Novo Mesto. November 2, 2012 is the starting date of the studied 
period, as this is when the cycle of contention in Slovenia began with 
mobilization (Durić, Žibret, 2017; Policija, 2013). The closing date is 
December 31, 2013, when the cycle ended in demobilization (GDELT, 
2018a; 2018b). The dates of mobilization and demobilization determine 
the time and organizational framework of the contention.
This research period is examined by applying a qualitative method of 
source analysis. The sources are the Slovenian National Police’s report 
Analiza aktivnosti policije ob protestih na območju Republike Slovenije 
(Policija, 2013) (in English: Activities of the Police regarding the Protests 
in the Republic of Slovenia) and the dataset of GDELT Event Database 
from the GDELT Project data. The search criteria used to generate the 
dataset were: Start Date = 11/02/2012, End Date = 12/31/2013, Actor1 
Country: Slovenia, Actor1 Type: all actors, Event Code: 14, Event Quad 
Class: Event Country: SI, Weighting: NUMEVENTST (GDELT, 2018a; 
2018b). The components of the GDELT dataset are PERL, R, and Google 
BigQuery, which offers a broad spectrum of information from highly di-
verse Slovenian and international media materials. The triangulation of 
sources enables the collection of reliable data and helps to avoid follow-
ing one discourse shaped by given actor of contentious politics.
Conceptual qualitative content analysis enables us to gather sufficient 
data to trace the dynamics of contention. The analysis makes use of Tilly 
and Tarrow’s research tool for analyzing contentious politics, which con-
sists of concepts and causal relationships between the phenomena de-
scribed by those concepts (Tilly, Tarrow, 2015, p. 13). The following parts 
of the article present and employ further methodological and theoretical 
assumptions in order to solve the research problems.
Dynamics of Contention in Post-2008 Slovenia
In this study, the period of contention, from mobilization on Novem-
ber 2, 2012 until demobilization on December 31, 2013, is divided into 
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fifteen episodes, understood as bounded sequences of continuous inter-
action (Tilly, Tarrow, 2015, p. 45). This allows us to look at the long 
streams of contention as a sequence of segments of the collective claims-
making for the purposes of systematic analysis. The episodes of collec-
tive claims-making (active episodes) and those when no claims-making 
occurred (passive episodes) alternated throughout the cycle of contention 
(Table 1). The contention brought together the subject (the claimant), the 
object (the addressee of a claim), and claims themselves (to end auster-
ity measures, extirpate corruption and clientelism, and depose Kangler, 
Janša, and Janković).
Table 1
Dynamics of Contention in Post-2008 Slovenia
No Episodes A B Contentious actions C D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Nov. 2, 2012–
Dec. 21, 2012
50 Yes – mass demonstration,
– rally,
– Internet-based call to action,
– charivaris,
– march,
– flower-giving
Yes 52000
2 Dec. 12, 2012 
–Jan. 10, 2013
20 No – Internet-based call to action No 0
3 Jan. 11, 2013 
–April 1, 2013
81 Yes – mass demonstration,
– rally
– Internet-based call to action,
– charivaris,
– march,
– flower-giving,
– Slovenian Culture Day,
– protestival,
– holy mass of the Trans-Uni-
versal Zombie Church of the 
Blissful Ringing
Yes 65000
4 April 2, 2013–
May 15, 2013
44 No – Internet-based call to action No 0
5 May 16, 2013– 
May 18, 2013
3 Yes – mass demonstration,
– Internet-based call to action,
– charivaris
No 30
6 May 19, 2013– 
June 25, 2013
38 No – Internet-based call to action No 0
7 June 26, 2013– 
July 1, 2013
6 Yes – mass demonstration,
– Internet-based call to action,
– charivaris
No 30
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 July 02, 2013–
July 7, 2013
6 No – Internet-based call to action No 0
9 July 08, 2013– 
August 25, 2013
49 Yes – mass demonstration
– Internet-based call to action
– charivaris
No 30
10 August 26, 2013 
–Sept. 05, 2013
11 No – Internet-based call to action No 0
11 Sept. 6, 2013–
Sept. 10, 2013
5 Yes – mass demonstration
– Internet-based call to action
– charivaris
No 20
12 Sept. 11, 2013– 
Oct. 01, 2013
21 No – Internet-based call to action No 0
13 Oct. 2, 2013–
Oct. 29, 2013
28 Yes – mass demonstration
– Internet-based call to action
– charivaris
No 20
14 Oct. 30, 2013–
Dec. 12. 2013
44 No – Internet-based call to action No 0
15 Dec. 13, 2013– 
Dec. 31, 2013
19 Yes – mass demonstration
– Internet-based call to action
– charivaris
No 20
A – Duration of active/passive episode (days);
B – Collective making of claims;
C – The use of particular performances alongside modular ones;
D – Number of active protesters.
Source: Own study on the basis of the Slovenian National Police’s report (Policija, 2013) 
and the dataset of GDELT Event Database (GDELT, 2018a; 2018b).
The “All-Slovenian People’s Uprisings,” as the group who began the 
protests in Maribor were called by the media and by the protesters them-
selves, mobilized and held protests, with the help of Facebook, blogs, 
and Twitter (Toplišek, Thomassen, 2017, p. 1390). On November 27, 
2012, after spreading to Ljubljana, the protest organized by individu-
als transformed into a diverse movement including students, lecturers, 
trade unionists, workers with insecure employment, pensioners, anar-
chists, ecologists, and socialists (Toplišek, Thomassen, 2017, p. 1390). 
The event that attracted 52,000 people (Policija, 2013; GDELT 2018a; 
2018b) was coordinated through the movement’s General Assembly, 
supported by smaller coordination groups (Toplišek, Thomassen, 2017, 
p. 1390). This required mutual communication and the coordination of 
claims-making (Tilly, Tarrow, 2015, p. 35), which was an important as-
pect of upward scale shift.
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Following the beginning of mobilization, until December 21, 2012, 
the protesters (the subject of contention) made claims on various occupy 
sites, mostly parks, streets, plazas, squares, city centers, and in front of 
state authority buildings, by modular contentious events: mass demon-
strations, rallies, Internet-based calls to action, charivaris (rough music 
used to make noise and express demands), and marches. Internet-based 
calls to action helped the claimants during every episode, and were the 
only type of contentious performance during passive episodes.
During the first episode, a particular contentious performance oc-
curred alongside modular ones. After fierce clashes with the police in De-
cember, people made use of flower-giving, which consisted of carrying 
carnations, handing them to police officers, and attaching them to police 
uniforms. This performance was intended to demonstrate the protesters’ 
peaceful attitudes toward the police, as the popular slogan stated: “The 
police are humans like us – we are in this difficult situation together” (No-
vak, 2013). This action contributed to the image of the contrast between 
the aggressive police and the peaceful protesters, who simply wished to 
express their opinion.
Note should be taken that contention spread swiftly across Slovenia 
and contentious performances took place in seventeen cities, located on 
the territory of every police unit (Policija, 2013). During the first ac-
tive episode, the protesters created and popularized a slogan, “Gotof je!/
Gotovi so!” (“He’s finished!/They’re finished!”) (Toplišek, Thomassen, 
2017, p. 1390). The slogan expressed opposition to Janša and the corrupt 
political elite that had imposed austerity measures on Slovenian society. 
The process of brokerage consisted of linking the previously unconnect-
ed sites. An array of factors led to coordination at a higher level and to 
the process of upward scale shift. Coordinated action indeed produced 
knock-on effects, including the development of new alliances between 
various social groups and attempts by state authorities to tear down of-
fending signs to discredit the protesters (Tilly, Tarrow, 2015, p. 35), e.g., 
the police removed a 20-meter banner reading “vstaja” (“uprising”) from 
the Ljubljana Castle tower (STA, T. M., 2013a).
As a result of the first episode, Kangler tendered his resignation on 
December 6, 2012 and left office on December 31, 2012 (Media servis, 
R.I., 2012; Rubin, S. M., 2012). Thus, the protesters achieved their first 
success; one of their claims had been met. This reinforced the protest-
ers’ confidence in the collective claims-making, gave them confidence 
for future triumphs, empowered their collective identity, and underpinned 
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social bonds between those who felt that their demand had been met due 
to their collective efforts.
On December 21, 2012, on the Slovenian Democratic Party’s (Slov-
enska demokratska stranka) Twitter profile, protesters were called “com-
munist zombies” led by “the uncles in the background” (political elites 
from the old regime – J. R.) (M. R., 2012; Gračner, 2013). Over the next 
contentious episodes, the words “communist” and “uncles” were used 
as a label for opponents to the austerity policies (Gračner, 2013). Janša 
failed to discredit the newly created contentious actor and unintention-
ally contributed to their identity shift and the strengthening of the collec-
tive identity of the protesters. Activists reclaimed the label, which was 
intended to be disrespectful to them, and created a positive symbol of 
their identity by wearing zombie masks during mass demonstrations and 
holding cultural performances with zombie puppets. Thus, not only did 
the statement spark the next round of collective claims-making but also 
created a powerful leitmotif for the next contentious episode.
Also, the Trans-Universal Zombie Church of the Blissful Ringing was 
founded in March 2013 and registered in the national registry of religious 
communities in 2014. The word “zombie” was added to the name after 
the protesters were called “communist zombies,” after a Facebook poll. 
The church sympathized with the claims of protesters. At this time, ac-
cording to the founder, it had about 10,000 followers (RT, 2014). This 
religious initiative empowered the subjects’ identity, sense of community, 
social bonds, and solidarity between individuals.
After Kangler’s resignation, which was perceived as success for the 
Maribor protesters, Slovenians from other cities realized the effectiveness 
of contentious politics. The third episode lasted from January 11, 2013 to 
April 1, 2013 and differed from the first in its use of additional particular 
contentious performances: Slovenian Culture Day, protestivals, and holy 
masses of the Trans-Universal Zombie Church of the Blissful Ringing or-
ganized in front of the National Assembly Building of Slovenia, labelled 
the “Temple of Corruption.” Protestivals aimed to provide people with an 
opportunity for the cultural expression of political claims through musi-
cal performances, physical theatre, puppets, and poetry (Novak, 2013). 
These innovations in repertories explain the growth in interest in conten-
tion and a higher turnout (McAdam, 1983, p. 736). Ordinary people found 
these particular contentious performances to be a good form of entertain-
ment. Cultural and religious interactive events were a distraction from 
their routine daily life.
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In the next episode, from December 22, 2012 until January 10, 2013, 
the protesters abandoned the collective claims-making. The most signifi-
cant episode started just after the publication of a report by the independ-
ent anti-corruption commission in Slovenia on January 9, 2013 (KPK, 
2013). The report was critical of Janša and Janković, who were accused 
of systematic and recurring violations of the law by not properly report-
ing their assets to the commission and avoiding reporting a private real-
estate deal with a company that had government contracts (KPK, 2013; 
Transparency International, 2013). After the report release, more people 
joined mass demonstrations and the pressure on Janša’s coalition partners 
to leave the government increased (Toplišek, Thomassen, 2017, p. 1392). 
The protesters wanted Janša and Janković to go the way of Kangler. On 
January 17, 2013, Janković temporarily stepped down from the role of 
president of the Positive Slovenia party, due to the allegations by the of-
ficial Commission for the Prevention of Corruption report (Petrovcic, 
2015). After a parliamentary vote of no confidence, Janša was ousted on 
February 27, 2013, which was considered by the protesters to be a land-
mark achievement for their collective action (Toplišek, Thomassen, 2017, 
p. 1392). This time, it was national, rather than local, politicians who 
were forced to step down. This was a success, but not an incentive to 
focus on the remaining claims regarding austerity measures, clientelism, 
and corruption in general.
Following Janša’s stepping down as a Prime Minister, after March 20, 
2013, the united position of the protesters fell apart. Allen Toplišek and 
Lasse Thomassen identify and scrutinize the two major paths chosen by 
activists. Some remained active in local communities and civil society but 
did not enter into party politics; others created a hybrid political movement 
to act both on the ground in civil society and through new political parties 
at the local, national, and European Union levels (Toplišek, Thomassen, 
2017, p. 1392). Additionally, Toplišek and Thomassen notice competi-
tion over the specific agenda within protest committees themselves and 
their split into two factions. The first group maintained that all politicians 
and political parties, regardless of political affiliation, were liable for the 
prevalence of corruption and clientelism and the state of the economy in 
Slovenia. The second shared the first group’s view but also contended 
that the protest committee must generate connections with other protest 
committees and create a new political party in Slovenia (Toplišek, Tho-
massen, 2017, pp. 1392–1393; Krašovec, 2013). The lack of a sense of 
common goals was a weakening factor.
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Although diffusion, brokerage, and coordination contributed to the 
spread of contention actions, they were insufficient to provide the protests 
with continuity. After the third episode, the number of active protesters 
fell dramatically from 65,000 between January 11, 2013 and April 1, 2013 
to no activity over the fourth episode (GDELT, 2018a; 2018b). There was 
no collective claims-making between April 2, 2013 and May 15, 2013. 
After April 2, 2013, turnout ranging from 0 to 30 protesters indicated that 
the process of demobilization was underway.
Collective claims-making was revived briefly between May 16–18, 
2013, but it only attracted about 30 activists (GDELT, 2018a; 2018b). 
Starting with this episode, each of the following active episodes had the 
same set of modular performances: mass demonstrations, Internet-based 
calls to action, and charivaris. No particular performances were held, 
which indicated the routinization of repertoire and a decrease in instiga-
tive innovations.
The sixth episode lasted from May 19, 2013 until June 25, 2013 and 
was marked by no collective claims-making. In this period, however, 
Janša was convicted of corruption and sentenced to two years in prison 
on June 5, 2013 (BBC, 2013). The protesters had no reason for renewing 
claims on this politician. There were still active episodes, because two 
other substantial claims remained unsatisfied. However, these contentious 
performances had a low turnout, which shows that the movement was 
not strong enough to make claims effectively. There was no significant 
event that affected contentious politics over the following episodes. The 
next active episode took place from June 26, 2013 until July 1, 2013 and 
involved 30 protesters (GDELT, 2018a; 2018b). This episode was fol-
lowed by a fleeting passive episode from July 2, 2013 until July 7, 2013. 
The ninth episode was of an active nature and lasted from July 8, 2013 
until August 25, 2013. As in the seventh episode, the turnout was around 
30 people (GDELT, 2018a; 2018b). From August 26, 2013 until Septem-
ber 5, 2013, no collective claims-making took place. An active episode 
took place between September 6, 2013 and September 10, 2013. The at-
tendance was slightly lower than during the ninth episode and totaled 
20 protesters (GDELT, 2018a; 2018b). A passive episode occurred from 
September 11, 2013 until October 1, 2013. The collective claims-mak-
ing began again October 2, 2013 and continued until October 29, 2013. 
Turnout was as low as over the previous active episode (GDELT, 2018a; 
2018b). The last passive episode before demobilization lasted from Oc-
tober 30, 2013 until December 12, 2013. The episode of the collective 
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claims-making that lasted from December 13, 2013 until December 31, 
2013 preceded demobilization. The last wave of protests failed to attract 
more than 20 people (GDELT, 2018a; 2018b).
Competition over the agenda, which substantially exhausted the pro-
testers, continued into the subsequent institutionalization of the protest 
movement into party politics. On December 14, 2013, the protesters set 
up a new political party, Solidarity (Solidarnost). In 2014, Solidarity be-
came a coalition partner for the Social Democrats (Socialni demokrati), 
the object of their claims during the protests, in the campaign for the 
Republic of Slovenia Early Elections to the National Assembly, but won 
no seats (Toplišek, Thomassen, 2017, p. 1393). It also won no seats in the 
European parliamentary election, receiving just 1.66% of the vote (EP, 
2014). More successful was the Initiative for Democratic Socialism (Ini-
ciativa za demokratični socializem) formed on March 8, 2014 by other 
protesters (Mo. B., Delo.si, STA, 2014). The Initiative for Democratic 
Socialism joined the United Left (Združena levica) and, in 2014, received 
5.97% of the vote in the Slovenian parliamentary election, thus receiv-
ing 6 seats together (Ministry of the Interior, 2014). The Initiative for 
Democratic Socialism won 5.47% of the vote in the European Parliament 
election and failed to win a seat (EP, 2014).
Conclusion: Processes of the 2013 Demobilization in Slovenia
This part of the article applies Tilly and Tarrow’s explanatory frame-
work of demobilization to capture and account for the processes that 
ended the cycle of contention in Slovenia. Analysis of the dynamics of 
contention shows that the process of demobilization began after the third 
contentious episode.
Tilly and Tarrow argue that mobilization is “an increase of the re-
sources available to a political actor for collective making of claims” 
(2015, p. 120). They consider mobilization the opposite of demobiliza-
tion, defined as “a reduction of this aggregation of resources” (Tilly, Tar-
row, 2015, pp. 120, 127). According to Tilly and Tarrow, the course and 
rate of demobilization depend on the initial conditions of mobilization, 
the strategy of elites and authorities in response to the makers of claims, 
and on the degree to which the protesters develop enduring structures to 
maintain their solidarity (2015, p. 127). In Slovenia, the process of demo-
bilization occurred after the achievement of the goals that were the easiest 
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to attain. The protesters were successful in achieving personnel changes 
at local (Kangler) and national (Janša and Janković) levels in the state 
apparatus. They settled for these cosmetic changes and lost momentum to 
pursue the remaining claims that were much more difficult to achieve, but 
which would be of greater importance for the political structure’s effec-
tiveness. The object was fulfilling the claims in stages until the collective 
making of claims was intense. As a result, no significant changes in politi-
cal elites took place and austerity measures remained unchanged.
In the period from mobilization to demobilization, the protesters 
maintained solidarity until after the third contentious episode. The label 
“zombie” was meant to discredit the protesters but contributed to their 
collective identity and marked successful particular contentious perform-
ances. Slovenian Culture Day, protestivals, and holy masses organized 
by the Trans-Universal Zombie Church of the Blissful Ringing attracted 
many ordinary people who strived to spend their free time in a novel way. 
The religious and cultural programs grabbed the attention of Slovenians 
for several weeks, and then quickly lost their novelty value.
Tilly and Tarrow argue that demobilization occurs when most of the 
protesters become discouraged by repression, boredom, and the desire 
to return to their normal lives. In Slovenia, however, repression was not 
a factor that influenced demobilization. The media did not present protest 
policing as illegitimate, and there were no complaints about the detention 
order (Policija, 2013; Maza, 2013). The extent of social legitimation of 
police behavior by participants in the protests was very high. The modular 
performance of flower-giving reveals that the protesters avoided oppos-
ing the police.
Nonetheless, boredom and the desire to go ‘back to normal’ were ob-
served after a relatively short period of avid interest in particular con-
tentious performances (Perković, Učakar, 2017, p. 304). Their potential 
for entertainment inevitably ran out when they became a part of routine 
daily life. The protesters avoided developing further novel actions so as 
to focus on the further collective making of claims and thus they let their 
mobilization potential drain.
Tilly and Tarrow assume that the leaders respond to the process of 
the protesters losing momentum in one of two antonymic ways. Firstly, 
institutionalization occurs, which involves “the substitution of the rou-
tines of organized politics for the disorder of life in the streets, buttressed 
by a mass organization and purposive incentive” (Tilly, Tarrow, 2015, 
p. 130). Indeed, there were some attempts to institutionalize the protesters 
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but internal competition precluded this. This meant that, in Slovenia, at-
tempts at institutionalization following demobilization were unsuccessful. 
The protest movement had no resources to renew the collective making 
of claims. Secondly, according to Tilly and Tarrow, the leaders responded 
by escalation, which is “the substitution of more extreme goals and more 
robust tactics for more moderate ones in order to maintain the interest of 
their supporters and attract new ones” (Tilly, Tarrow, 2015, p. 130). The 
escalation that occurred in the party political programs which followed 
the protests failed to retain wavering or attract new supporters, which the 
election results clearly demonstrate.
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Od mobilizacji do demobilizacji: dynamika konfliktu w Słowenii w okresie 
wychodzenia z kryzysu ekonomicznego 
 
Streszczenie
Celami artykułu są: przeanalizowanie dynamiki konfliktu, który wystąpił w Sło-
wenii w okresie wychodzenia z kryzysu ekonomicznego, wyjaśnienie, dlaczego 
pomimo początkowych sukcesów ruchu protestu konflikt zakończył się procesami 
demobilizacji oraz zweryfikowanie mocy eksplanacyjnej modelu teoretycznego de-
mobilizacji autorstwa Charlesa Tilly’ego i Sidney’a Tarrowa. Badanie wykorzystuje 
metodę analizy źródeł, jakościową konceptualną analizę treści i siatkę kategorialną 
teorii konfliktu do rozwiązania problemów badawczych: jaka była dynamika konflik-
tu w Słowenii? I dlaczego konflikt zakończył się demobilizacją? Studium pokazuje, 
że po okresie masowej mobilizacji doszło do zwiększenia skali protestów. Zmiana 
ta polegała na rozprzestrzenieniu konfliktu poza Maribor, czyli obszar jego powsta-
nia, zaangażowaniu nowych podmiotów politycznych za sprawą wspólnoty interesów 
i wartości, rozszerzeniu spektrum miejsc publicznych, które mogły służyć domaganiu 
się realizacji żądań prowadzącemu do ich zaspokojenia przez podmioty państwowe. 
Dynamikę konfliktu wyznaczyły jego aktywne i bierne epizody. Zmiana tożsamości 
ruchu i zakończone sukcesem rozpoznanie żądań zdeterminowały wykorzystanie róż-
nych typów protestu i serię epizodów. Procesy demobilizacji rozpoczęły się, gdy do-
tychczasowi aktywiści przestali uczestniczyć w protestach, zaniechali organizowania 
specjalnych wydarzeń i wdrażania innowacji w modułowych akcjach. Demobilizacja 
nastąpiła wraz z rezygnacją większości zaangażowanych w działalność ruchu z prote-
stowania z powodów znudzenia tą formą aktywności politycznej i pragnienia powrotu 
do rutyny codzienności.
 
Słowa kluczowe: demobilizacja, dynamika konfliktu, tożsamość zbiorowa, ruch pro-
testu, repertuar konfliktu
